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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Scott Molen appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct 
with a minor under the age of sixteen. Mr. Molen was convicted following a jury trial and 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with eight years fixed. 
Mr. Molen now appeals, and he asserts that: 1) the district court erred by failing to give 
a unanimity instruction; 2 )  the district court erred by excluding evidence of the alleged 
victim's sexual knowledge and behavior; 3) his right to due process was violated by the 
use of his silence to have the jury infer guilt; and 4) the district court abused its 
I, , ,, . I. . . 
discretion by failing to strike an allegation of criminal activity from the Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinaffer, PSI). This Reply Brief responds to the first two issues 
iin abpeal, 
. . ,.. , . . . 
,..:: .. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Molen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court denying Mr. Molen's statutory and constitutional rights to a 
unanimous jury by failing to give a unanimity instruction? 
2. Did the district court err by excluding evidence of S.Z.'s sexual knowledge? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Denied Mr. Molen His Constitutional And Statutorv Riahts To A 
Unanimous Jurv Verdict When It Failed To Give The Jurv A Unanimity Instruction 
A. Introduction 
The district court instructed the jury that Mr. Molen could be found guilty of lewd 
conduct if jurors determined that he committed the crime in either 2004 or 2005 and the 
jury heard evidence of several acts of alleged criminal conduct. Despite the jurors 
hearing about separate incidents of criminal conduct upon which they could find guilt on 
the criminal charge, the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously 
agree on the specific incident constituting the offense. In failing to give the obligatory 
unanimity instruction, the district court denied Mr. Molen's constitutional and statutory 
rights to a unanimous verdict, thereby committing both reversible and fundamental 
error 
6 .  The District Court Erred When It Failed To Give The Jury A Unanimity lnstruction 
The State asserts that, because the jury was not presented evidence of separate 
acts of genital-to-genital contact, the district court did not err by failing to give a 
unanimity instruction. (Respondent's Brief, p.4.) The State's argument overlooks the 
definition of genital-to-genital contact, and a review of the record shows that the jury did 
hear evidence of multiple acts. 
The State seems to equate genital-to-genital contact with an act of sexual 
intercourse, as the State asserts that the only act of genital-to-genital contact in this 
case occurred when Mr. Molen allegedly penetrated S.Z.'s vagina with his penis. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.5.) However, the jury was instructed that it was not necessary 
that skin be touched; touching could occur through the clothing. (Jury Instruction 12.) 
Genital-to-genital contact, therefore, need not be intercourse. 
This Court need not look anywhere beyond S.Z.'s testimony to find evidence of 
multiple acts. On cross-examination, S.Z. testified that "sex stuff happened three times 
the first summer and "one or two times" the second summer. (Tr., p.331, L.21 - p.332, 
L.5.) "Sex stuff," meaning, "touching on [her] privates," happened one or two times in 
2005 and about three times in 2004. (Tr., p.332, Ls.6-16.) She stated that one time, 
they "both had their underwear on" but he was "still doing that." (Tr., p.342, Ls.24-25.) 
She specifically stated that on other occasions "privates touched without any clothes 
on." (Tr., p.343, Ls.17-20.) S.Z. also specifically stated that she thought intercourse 
happened four to five times; she had previously stated in the preliminary hearing that it 
happened twelve times. (Tr., p.340, Ls.6-7.) She specifically testified that in 2004, 
Mr. Molen "did it three times," and by "did it," she meant, "sex stuff." (Tr., p.318, L.22 - 
p.319, L.2.) She testified that something "like sex" happened in Mr. Molen's camper 
and tent, although with clothes on and no penetration occurring. (Tr., p.318, Ls.1-13.) 
However, genital-to-genital contact can occur through the clothing and penetration is not 
required. 
Individual members of the jury could have found that genital-to-genital contact 
happened when Mr. Molen and S.Z. were in the camper, when they were in the tent, or 
that it happened three times in the first summer and one or two times in the second 
summer rather than the event of intercourse described by S.Z. In fact, there is evidence 
in the record that places reason to doubt that intercourse occurred. Mr. Molen's expert 
witness , Dr. Friedlander, testified that that he found no evidence of blunt force trauma 
and it would be "extremely hard to believe" that penetration had occurred. (Tr., p.695, 
Ls.?-6.) In describing the report, Dr. Friedlander stated, 
We have - we can put together the anatomy of this child's hymen from 
looking at the photos. [...I 
The books will show the ring of the hymen, the entry ring of the hymen. 
There is almost always, without exception, a very - an opening in the 
center of the hymen that's present from birth. Books will show this is 
round. The truth is it's never round. 
The examiner correctly described a mound at the 6 o'clock position. This 
is present, and you can see it just by the shadows. You can see that it's a 
bump. 
Next to this bump, I see very clearly a second larger somewhat flatter 
mound here, okay, but then continues up here. And the reason that I 
believe what the colposcopist is describing as a notch at 8:30 is actually 
the edge of the mound. 
If I can think what to compare it to, it might - look at the edge of one of 
these beautiful mesas that we have in Idaho, you see the angle, and we 
call that a notch. 
Now, over here, we have a lesion, what appears to be a - you can tell, 
again, by the shadow. The shadow is present right in here. We have a 
fold. It's like if I folded my necktie, this looks like a notch, really it's a fold 
in the tissue. And you can see this even, as a shadow, perhaps a shadow 
behind that, behind the mesa. So this creates the illusion that we have a 
second notch. 
Okay. Now, when the hymen is traumatized, I want you to think about 
what might happen if the frenum under your lip or under your lower lip or 
under your tongue was torn. It would heal from the bottom. So you're 
likely to get - if this is the original tear, it will tend to heal in the depths 
first, and you're likely to end up with what I'm illustrating in black, a much 
smaller notch on the surface. 
But I don't see these notches. This appears to be just the end of a 
mound. And we have here a fold. 
So, in my opinion [...I we've gone from a finding that's somewhat 
worrisome for sexual abuse to a normal anatomy. Mounds are 
normal. Folds, of course, are just folds. 
And to avoid this kind of problem with folds is why a child should be 
examined and should be photographed from several positions, 
which I think was probably not done here. 
(Tr., p.689, L.21 - p.692, L.3 (emphasis added.)) Based on his review of the report, 
Dr. Friedlander testified that, "I find it hard to believe, extremely hard to believe," that 
S.Z. had been penetrated. (Tr., p.694, L.24 - p.695, L.3.) Because the jury heard 
evidence of multiple acts and could have based its verdict, in part, on any one of them, 
the district court erred by failing to give a unanimity instruction. 
Also, Mr. Molen may indeed rely on S.Z.'s CARES testimony and video in this 
case to show that he was being accused of multiple acts. The State asserts that they 
are not substantive evidence. (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) First, the CARES evidence 
was introduced by stipulation, not pursuant to a hearsay exception. (Tr., p.870, Ls.8- 
10.) Furthermore, no limiting instruction was given when the evidence was admitted. 
(Tr., p.490, Ls.15-21; Tr., p.870, Ls.8-10.) Additionally, even to the extent that it was 
admitted only for purposes of credibility, the jury could use the evidence to determine 
how many instances of illegal conduct it believed occurred and could have based its 
verdict on that basis. 
Further, contrary to the State's position, Mr. Molen's reliance on the preliminary 
hearing testimony is indeed proper. The State asserts that the hearing was never 
placed into evidence and was only read during closing argument. (Respondent's Brief, 
p.10.) However, S.Z. was specifically cross-examined on her preliminary hearing 
testimony and she acknowledged that she stated that sex occurred about twelve times. 
(Tr., p.339, L.14 - p.340, L.7.) At trial she modified her answer to four or five times. 
(Tr., p.340, Ls.6-7.) Mr. Molen's reliance on the preliminary hearing testimony is proper. 
Finally, the State asserts that any error in failing to give the instruction was 
harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-13.) The State is incorrect. The State relies 
primarily on the harmless error analysis in Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268-69, 16 
P.3d 937, 944-45 (Ct. App. 2000). Essentially, the State argues that because Mr. Molen 
was convicted, the jury made a credibility determination in favor of S.Z. and therefore 
any error is harmless. 
First, taking this argument to its logical conclusion, anytime that a defendant is 
convicted, the error would be harmless because the jury would have come to the 
conclusion that the victim was credible. Second, Miller is very different from the instant 
case. In Miller, the Court of Appeals noted, "C.B.'s testimony relating to the specific 
instances of sexual misconduct was uncontradicted." Id. at 268, 16 P.3d at 944. 
Further, this uncontradicted testimony on any one of the specific instances of manual- 
genital contact would have satisfied Count I. Id. In this case, S.Z.'s testimony is 
contradicted both by herself and Mr. Molen. At trial, S.Z. testified that intercourse 
occurred only once; she had previously stated in the preliminary hearing that it 
happened twelve times and stated at trial that it could have happened four or five times. 
(Tr., p.340, Ls.6-7.) Mr. Molen testified that he never touched S.Z. inappropriately. 
(Tr., p.635, L.24 - p.635, L.18.) S.Z.'s testimony is not uncontradicted. In this case it is 
very possible that the jury did not believe all of S.Z.'s testimony but did not believe 
Mr. Molen either, and thus individual jurors could have reached different conciusions as 
to what conduct Mr. Molen was guilty of. 
Further, the State's reliance on State v. Banks, 46 P.3d 546 (Kan. 2002) is 
unavailing. Much of the Banks analysis was disapproved by State v. Voyles, 160 P.3d 
794, 805 (Kan. 2007). In Voyles, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that Kansas 
appellate courts have held that the failure to give a unanimity instruction to be reversible 
error except when the defendant presents a "unified defense, e.g., a general denial." Id. 
The Voyles Court noted, however, that "we are not dealing with simply a unified defense 
- in one of its purest forms, a mere credibility contest between the victims and the 
alleged perpetrator." Id. This is because, "we have some discrepancies between the 
girls themselves, some discrepancies between the girls and Miller, and some 
inconsistencies in C.C.'s statements, i.e., what she told Theis on the videotape and 
what she testified to at trial." Id. The Voyles Court noted that the Banks Court did not 
believe that the difference in testimony of the victims concerning the number of times 
there were touched at each location was determinative and therefore failure to give the 
instruction was harmless. Id. But, "[tlhis general rationale from Banks is disapproved." 
Id. 
In this case there are discrepancies between what S.Z. testified to at trial, what 
she testified to at the preliminary hearing, and what she told the CARES interviewer. In 
such a case, it is very possible that the jury did not believe every allegation that S.Z. 
made even though Mr. Molen issued a general denial. The jury could have disbelieved 
Mr. Molen and parts of S.Z.'s testimony. The failure to give the unanimity instruction is 
not harmless error. 
The District Court Denied Mr. Molen's Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment Riahts To 
Cross-Examination And His Fourteenth Amendment Riqht To Due Process Bv Not 
Allowing Questionina Concernina The Alleaed Victim's Exposure To Sexual Acts 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Molen asserts that the district court denied his right to cross-examination 
protected by the Sixth Amendment and his right to due process protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying him the right to 
present evidence that the victim's sexual knowledge did not come from the alleged 
incident. Further, he asserts that his proferred evidence was relevant. 
B. The District Court Denied Mr. Molen's Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment Rights 
To Cross-Examination And His Fourteenth Amendment Riaht To Due Process By 
Not Allowina Questionin0 Concerninq The Alleqed Victim's Exposure To Sexual 
Preliminarily, the State asserts that Mr. Molen may not bring his constitutional 
claims because they were not raised in the district court. The State is mistaken. In 
State V. Araiza, 124 ldaho 82, 856 P.2d 872 (1993), the ldaho Supreme Court stated: 
Araiza contends that even if the trial court's ruling was proper under I.R.E. 
608(b), the limitation on his opportunity to impeach Cunningham violated 
his Sixth Amendment riaht to confront witnesses. Although Araiza did not 
present this issue to the trial court, we address the issue. If the limitation 
on Araiza's opportunity to impeach Cunningham through cross- 
examination were error, it would be fundamental error because it goes to 
the foundation or basis of Araiza's rights. State v. Kenner, 121 ldaho 594, 
597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992). 
Id. at 91, 856 P.2d at 881. Further, Mr. Molen specifically asserted the following in his 
Appellant's Brief: 
The Supreme Court further held in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 
(1 973), that: 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, 
in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against 
the State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross- 
examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf 
have long been recognized as essential to due process. 
Id. at 294. In Sfate v. Perry, 139 ldaho 520, 81 P.3d 1230 (2003), the 
Idaho Supreme Court recognized that a defendant's right to present 
evidence is fundamental, but subject to reasonable limitations. Id. at 523, 
81 P.3d at 1233 (citations omitted). 
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) This Court may, therefore, address this issue 
However, even if the State is correct and only an argument concerning relevance 
and prejudice are preserved, the district court still erred. The State wishes to focus only 
the specific allegation that S.Z. had knowledge of oral sex, sex like "doggies do it," and 
wanted a "tattoo on her pooty." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) However, Mr. Molen also 
sought evidence that S.Z. was familiar with sex because she had observed her mother 
having sex and her mother discussed sex with her. (R., Vol. 11 p.293.) Specifically, 
counsel argued the following: 
One of the most pressing questions the jury will ask itself is how this eight 
year old girl would know so much about sex unless she had actually been 
molested. The defense will produce several witnesses, including the 
sisters and mother of the Tiffany Davidson, the alleged victim's mother, 
who will testify that Tiffany Davidson has exposed her daughter, [S.Z.] to a 
constant, graphic, sexually charged lifestyle for her entire life, including 
openly having sex with multiple partners with [S.Z.] in the home, openly 
discussing and showing sex toys and pornography in front of [S.Z.], and 
openly disrobing in front of other family members in the presence of [S.Z.], 
etc. This evidence is not only relevant under IRE Rule 401 and 402, it is 
crucial to the jury's understanding of the accuser's knowledge of sexual 
matters and how she obtained it. Without it, the jury will make 
assumptions that are in no way based in reality. 
(R., pp.289-90.) As set forth in the initial Appellant's Brief, S.Z.'s knowledge of sex was 
very relevant as it could have provided an explanation of how she could have known 
about sex apart from the instant allegations against Mr. Molen. Further, the probative 
value is not outweighed by confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and unfair 
prejudice. In fact, the opposite is true; the source of a child's sexual knowledge is 
extremely relevant. The defendant must have the opportunity to show possible 
alternative explanations for the child's ability to describe sexual events. The district 
court erred by refusing to permit Mr. Molen to admit this evidence into trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Molen requests that his conviction for lewd conduct be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, he requests that it be remanded for 
correction of his PSI. 
DATED this 17'~ day of April, 2009. 
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